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1. Introduction 
 
The work of David Over has contributed to the immigration of the Suppositional 
Theory of conditionals from philosophy to the psychology of reasoning and to the 
effortless communication between the two disciplines within this subfield of 
psychology, more generally. According to the Suppositional Theory of conditionals, the 
word ‘if’ owes its distinctive character to its role in hypothetical thought by engaging 
the imagination to simulate possibilities (Evans and Over, 2004; Evans, 2007). For 
more than a decade of research, the Suppositional Theory of conditionals has become 
a widely accepted theory in the psychology of reasoning and has been gaining grounds 
over against the mental model theory, which remains a popular theory of other types 
of reasoning like spatial reasoning (Johnson-Laird, 2008). 
 The evidence for the Suppositional Theory encompasses three sources: 
 
1) Direct investigations of the probability of indicative conditionals, which 
substantiate “the Equation” (P(if A, then C) = P(C|A)) (Oberauer and 
Wilhelm, 2003; Evans and Over, 2004).  
2) The pattern of results known as “the defective truth table” effect, which 
corroborates the de Finetti truth table (Politzer, Over, and Baratgin, 2010; 
Baratgin, Over, and Politzer, 2013; Baratgin, Politzer, Over, and Takahashi, 
2018), see Table 1.  
3) Indirect evidence from the uncertain and-to-if inference task (Cruz, 
Baratgin, Oaksford, and Over, 2015). 
 
 
  
 
 
In spite of all this support, the Suppositional Theory of conditionals has recently been 
challenged by a new-comer to the psychology of reasoning known as Inferentialism 
Table 1. Truth Tables, Indicative Conditional 
A C ⊃  De Finetti Jeffrey 
⊤ ⊤ ⊤ ⊤ ⊤ 
⊤ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ 
⊥ ⊤ ⊤ void P(C|A) 
⊥ ⊥ ⊤ void P(C|A) 
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(Spohn, 2013; Olsen, 2014; Douven, 2015; Krzyżanowska, 2015). Inferentialism holds 
that indicative conditionals express inferential relations, or reason relations. On the 
strong reading, Inferentialism makes reason relations part of the truth conditions of 
indicative conditionals ("Truth-Conditional Inferentialism", Douven, 2015; 
Krzyżanowska, 2015). In Skovgaard-Olsen, Singmann, and Klauer (2016a), a weaker 
probabilistic implementation of inferentialism was made through the Default and 
Penalty Hypothesis, which makes it part of the probability and acceptability 
assessment of indicative conditionals that participants evaluate whether a sufficient 
reason is expressed, which consequently makes missing-link conditionals, like the 
following, appear defective: 
(1) If Niels Bohr read Kierkegaard, then Copenhell plays loud music. 
Given that there is no obvious connection between biographical facts relating to Niels 
Bohr and facts about the Danish metal festival.  
 
2. Data on Missing-Link Conditionals 
 In a series of experiments, my collaborators and I have reassessed each of these 
three sources of evidence for the Suppositional Theory of conditionals anew through 
the application of novel stimulus materials that factorially combine all permutations of 
prior probability and relevance levels of two conjoined sentences. The general idea 
behind these experiments was to test how robust the Suppositional Theory is under 
extreme conditions. To draw an analogy: for a researcher interested in examining 
rationality, it makes sense to study cases of irrationality to investigate the boundary 
conditions and limitations of human rationality. For a researcher interested in studying 
text comprehension, it is a valuable research strategy to study cases, where 
participants experience difficulties in deciphering the meaning of concatenated strings 
of words. Similarly, for researchers interested in studying relevance, and our use of 
conditionals to express reason relations, it is a sound research strategy to 
systematically investigate cases where relevance and reason relations break down. 
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 In Skovgaard-Olsen, Singmann, and Klauer (2016a) it was found that the 
Equation (P(if A, then C) = P(C|A)) only holds under the condition of positive relevance 
(where ΔP > 0, for ΔP = P(C|A) – P(C|¬A)). In the case of negative relevance (ΔP < 0), or 
irrelevance (ΔP = 0), like the Niels Bohr example above, the strong relationship 
between P(if A, then C) and P(C|A) is disrupted, because participants tend to view 
natural language indicative conditionals as defective under these conditions.1 
Moreover, it was shown that these results generalize to evaluations of acceptability, 
when participants are instructed to judge the adequacy of the information provided in 
the context of a conversation. In contrast, the Equation was found to fit the probability 
and acceptability evaluations of concessive conditionals (‘Even if A, then still C’) 
remarkably well across all relevance conditions. But this nevertheless poses a problem 
since the Equation was formulated as a thesis about indicative conditionals and not as 
a thesis concerning concessive conditionals. 
 In Skovgaard-Olsen, Singmann, and Klauer (2016b), it was found that the latter 
results generalize to the uncertain and-to-if inference task, where participants assign 
probabilities to conjunctions and conditionals in arguments, and that empirical 
support could be found for the explications of reason relations and epistemic 
relevance in terms of ∆P used in these studies. Indeed, the absolute values of 
participants’ conformity to P(if A, then C) ≥ P(A,C), which is normatively prescribed by 
the Suppositional Theory, showed a drop from 87% in the positive relevance condition 
to 54% in the irrelevance condition. And this was a drop that was not reflected in 
either participants’ conformity to P(C|A) ≥ P(A,C) or P(Even if A, then still C) ≥ P(A,C), 
which both stayed constant at around 78% across relevance conditions. This finding 
presents supporters of the Suppositional Theory with a dilemma. The finding appears 
to show that either participants are less probabilistically coherent than it initially 
appeared in Cruz et al. (2015) or that a substantial part of the participants do not 
follow the Equation across relevance levels. In Skovgaard-Olsen, Kellen, Hahn, and 
                                                             
1  Some of these findings have been replicated by Vidal and Baratgin (2017) using 
different methods (but see Cruz, Over, Oaksford, and Baratgin, 2016 and the reply in 
Krzyzanowska, Collins, and Hahn, 2017). 
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Klauer (2019b), further individual variation in these results was investigated by 
classifying participants into opposing profiles of probability and entailment judgments 
based on their case judgments and reflective attitudes. Here again it was found that 
the majority part of the participants did not follow the Equation across relevance 
levels.     
Finally, in Skovgaard-Olsen, Kellen, Krahl, and Klauer (2017), truth, acceptability, 
and probability evaluations of ‘if then’, ‘and’, ‘but’, and ‘therefore’ sentences were 
investigated under different relevance conditions. It was found that the de Finetti 
truth table could account for maximally a third of the participants, which was in line 
with the results of a recent meta-analysis (Schroyens, 2010). However, the results do 
not yet tell us whether revising the Suppositional Theory by the Jeffrey table, where 
the value 'void' is replaced by conditional probabilities in the false antecedent cells 
(see Table 1), provides a better fit to the data (Over and Baratgin, 2017).   
A further finding of Skovgaard-Olsen et al. (2017) was that support could not be 
obtained for the distinctive predictions of Truth-Conditional Inferentialism, according 
to which indicative conditionals should be true only when the antecedent is a good 
reason for the consequent. Instead, participants responded that both conditionals 
with negative relevance (e.g. “if you hit the brakes, the car will speed up”), and 
missing-link conditionals like (1) above, are true when the antecedent and 
consequents are both true.2 In this, the results indicate that there is a strong 
dissociation between the influence of relevance on assessments of acceptability and 
probability compared to truth evaluations, when investigating ‘and’, ‘but’, ‘therefore’, 
and ‘if then’ sentences. These results were interpreted by Skovgaard-Olsen et al. 
(2017) as showing that there is a deeply entrenched modularization between the 
processes and/or representations tapped into by the experimental tasks reported. 
Taken together with the acceptability evaluations from Skovgaard-Olsen et al. 
(2016a), the results in Skovgaard-Olsen et al. (2017) indicate that indicative 
conditionals behave like ‘therefore’ sentences in their probability and acceptability                                                              
2  But see also the apparent support for Truth-Conditional Inferentialism in Douven, 
Elqayam, Singmann, & van Wijnbergen-Huitink (2018) using a different type of task. 
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evaluations, and opposite to ‘but’ sentences, with respect to the relevance 
manipulation. Yet in relation to the truth evaluations, ‘and’, ‘therefore’, and ‘but’ 
sentences did not differ across relevance conditions, and no evidence for a relevance 
effect on the true antecedent cells of the truth table of the indicative conditional could 
be found. Moreover, the consistent high confidence ratings of the participants did not 
indicate that they were in a state of conflict, when assigning truth values to sentences 
that contradicited their reason-relation readings. However, for the ⊥⊥ cell, a moderate 
relevance effect was found on the truth evaluation of the indicative conditional. 
These results present a puzzle. On the one hand, it is possible to interpret the 
reported dissociation between truth evaluations and probability/acceptability 
evaluations as indicating a dissociation between semantic and pragmatic processing of 
content—with relevance almost exclusively affecting the latter. However, on this 
interpretation it is still odd that the strong probabilistic relevance effects reviewed 
above could be found on experimental tasks, which have been used by supporters of 
the Suppositional Theory to provide evidence in favor of a semantic theory 
(Skovgaard-Olsen et al., 2016a). On the other, it is possible that some other 
explanation for the dissociation in Skovgaard-Olsen et al. (2017) can be found based 
on subtle differences in the experimental tasks.  
According to Tonhauser and Matthewson (2015), it is commonly assumed that an 
linguistic expression uttered at a context c is acceptable iff: (1) it is syntactically well-
formed, (2) felicitous, and (3) its truth conditions are compatible with c. (1) is beyond 
dispute for missing-link conditionals. Hence, most of the energy has been focused on 
(2) and (3), with proponents of the Suppositional Theory of conditionals diagnosing 
missing-link conditionals as unacceptable because their felicity conditions are not 
satisfied (possibly due to the violation of a Gricean maxim), and Truth-Conditional 
Inferentialism holding that missing-link conditionals instantiate a case, where the truth 
conditions are not compatible with the context of use. 
Since the boundary between semantics and pragmatics will feature centrally in 
the interpretation of the abovementioned empirical results, the rest of this chapter is 
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focused on outlining some of the open theoretical issues raised by the data on 
missing-link conditionals. 
 
3. Semantic and Pragmatic Factors 
In deciding whether the dissociation reported in Skovgaard-Olsen et al. (2017) has 
implications for whether relevance is to be counted as a semantic or pragmatic factor, 
the following questions merit further investigation: 
 
(I) What interpretation of ‘truth’ do participants have when providing truth 
evaluations?  
 
The importance of (I) can be illustrated as follows. Suppose that participants make 
truth value assignments based on an understanding of 'truth' as 'what can be proven 
in principle independent of whether it has actually been proven'. In that case, the 
truth table for negation would no longer be truth-functional inasmuch as there would 
be propositions for which both a proposition and its negation would be 'False'. 
Moreover, for this understanding of truth, '∨' and '⊃' would no longer be truth-
functional, since it can be shown that the truth functionality of '∨' and '⊃' depends on 
the truth functionality of negation (McCawley, 1993: 107ff).   
 Indeed, many other ways of interpreting the notion of truth exist. In the 
philosophical literature (Künne, 2005), realistic conceptions of truth (e.g. the 
correspondence theory of truth, “truth is what corresponds to the facts”) are 
contrasted with epistemic concepts of truth (e.g. the coherence theory “truth is what 
belongs to a maximally coherent set of beliefs” or “truth is what all investigators would 
agree on at the limit of an ideal inquiry”), pragmatic theories (“truth is what works”), 
and with deflationary theories (e.g. “the predicate ‘true’ is merely a convenient device 
for disquotating sentences, or a device for forming pro-sentences, which allows us to 
endorse assertions that we would not be able to endorse otherwise (e.g. “the next 
thing Pete says is true”, “Everything the Pope says is true”)).  
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 At present it is unknown which understanding of the notion of ‘truth’ participants 
bring to bear on the truth table task. It is unknown whether the different truth tables 
elicited by participants reflect different notions of truth or diverging interpretations of 
the conditional. And it is moreover unknown whether participants understand the 
notion of truth in the same way as the semantic theory they are being tested 
according to. 
 Interestingly, Oberauer et al. (2007) found that the same group of participants 
that tended to conform to the de Finetti table in a ternary truth table task tended to 
conform to the material implication (⊃) in a binary truth table task—although the two 
theories stand as diametrically opposite in the literature. It is thus possible that 
participants interpret the truth values differently in the two experimental paradigms.  
 Arguably, the truth table of the material implication sounds most plausible, if one 
interprets the truth value as indicating consistency.3 Accordingly, the material 
implication treats the conditional as true in the false antecedent cells, because the 
falsity of the antecedent is consistent with the truth of the conditional. This might 
account for the fact that the material implication is useful in mathematical and logical 
contexts, where the goal is to keep inconsistency at bay. In line with this idea of the 
material implication as especially useful for mathematics and deductive logic, Rescher 
(2007: 43) points out that what makes the material implication appropriate for these 
contexts is the following link between implications and deducibility that it establishes 
for demonstratively true instances: p ⊢ q iff ⊢ p ⊃ q.4  
In contrast, the de Finetti truth table seems to be most plausible if ‘true’ is 
interpreted as ‘verification’ and ‘falsity’ is interpreted as ‘disconfirmation’. In this 
context, it is interesting to observe that in some experiments cited in favor of the de 
Finetti truth table (like Evans et al., 2007), the instructions explicitly ask for whether a 
truth table cell “conforms” to a conditional rule, “contradicts” it or “is irrelevant” to it, 
rather than for the truth or falsity of the conditional simpliciter. 
                                                             
3  I thank Christoph Klauer (p. c.) for discussion. 
4  However, as Rescher (2007: 44) points out, a demonstrated true material implication 
in mathematics and deductive logic is in fact a strict implication, ◻(p ⊃ q). 
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Usually, issues pertaining to competing notions of truth are not even discussed in 
the psychological literature. Elqayam’s (2003) insightful discussion of the impact of 
conflicting notions of truth on the knights-knave paradigm is an exception. Another 
exception is the emphasis on so-called pleonastic or pragmatic uses of truth in which 
the notion is merely a convenient way of expressing endorsement of, or agreement 
with, a sentence (Edgington, 2003; Over, Hadjichristidis, Evans, Handley, & Sloma, 
2007). On this notion, the truth predicate may be applied even to expressions of 
subjective taste without indicating an ontic commitment concerning corresponding 
facts (Politzer et al., 2010).  
 
(II) What is the relationship between (a) the semantic values invoked by a given 
semantic theory and (b) what the participants are evaluating in a given 
experimental paradigm?  
 
Semantic values are theoretical entities that are introduced primarily to serve the 
explanatory roles of accounting for compositionality and entailments. The semantic 
values invoked by some semantic theories have very little to do with our intuitive 
judgments on truth and falsity. For instance, semantics for the indicative conditional 
and other connate epistemic expressions exist, which pose constraints on probability 
distributions as semantic values (e.g. Yalcin, 2012; Moss, 2015). Yet constraints on 
probability distributions do not themselves impose truth conditions that can be 
interpreted as representing ways that the world can be. For instance, even the 
constraint that P(A) = 1.0 means that A is certain according to the doxastic state 
represented by P, rather than that A is an independent fact about the world.   
 Moreover, as Dever (2006) explains, Fregean truth-conditional semantics has 
been generalized in a number of ways which render the relationship between 
semantic values and truth simpliciter less direct. In intensional possible-worlds 
semantics, truth conditions are specified in terms of truth-at-a-world to account for 
non-truth-functional operators such as modalities (and conditionals, on some views). 
In two-dimensional semantics, like Kaplan’s (1989) semantics of indexicals, truth is 
indexed both to a context and to a world-time pair, which means that both the 
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semantic content of an expression and its truth value can vary with different contexts 
of use. In MacFarlane (2014) and Lasersohn (2017), this idea is generalized to relativize 
truth conditions of subjective content like taste judgments to both a context of use 
and a context of assessment. In dynamic semantics still other semantic values are 
invoked. In dynamic semantics it is typically the context-change potential of linguistic 
expressions to modify an information state that is emphasized rather than their ability 
to represent how the world is, and discourses as a whole are treated as having truth 
conditions rather than individual sentences (Rotschild and Yalcin, 2016). 
 Moreover, recent developments in metasemantics make sharp distinctions 
between the explanatory role of (intentional) content, as the notion figures in mental 
causation and folk-psychological explanations of behavior, and semantic values, as the 
theoretical entities needed to account for our linguistic competence relating to various 
facts about compositionality, entailment, and truth values etc. (Yalcin, 2014, 2018). 
 In addition to these developments in what kind of theoretical entity can play the 
role of semantic values in formal semantics, there is the added complexity in 
interpreting truth table data that there is some precedence in the linguistic literature 
for not taking intuitive judgments of truth and falsity at face value.  
 For instance, von Fintel (2004) and Abrusán and Szendrői (2013) have argued 
that intuitive judgments on presupposition failures5 as true or false are influenced by 
pragmatic factors such as the possibility of verification and need not represent the 
sentences’ actual semantic values. Instead, it is argued that it is more decisive whether 
the semantic values assigned would allow us to construct a systematic theory of the 
compositional behavior of the linguistic expressions in question. Accordingly, in Winter 
(2016: 20), it is made an empirical adequacy condition of theories in formal semantics 
that they agree with intuitive entailment judgments rather than with intuitive truth 
judgments. This suggests that the tendency in the psychology of reasoning to focus on 
the truth table task as decisive evidence for or against a semantic theory may turn out 
to be problematic.                                                              
5  E.g. ‘the Danish Pope is in his midsixties’ carries the false presupposition that there is a 
Danish Pope. 
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In Tonhauser and Matthewson (2015) an attempt is made to rank different types 
of tasks based on the extent to which they lead to robust, replicable, and transparent 
pieces of data. Their tentative rank order looks as follows: 
   Translation  <   �
Paraphrase entailment judgment 
ambiguity judgment
�   <  truth value judgment  <?   � acceptability judgmentsimplication judgments
similarity judgments
 � 
As they point out, one problem with truth value judgments is that untrained 
participants may find it difficult to properly distinguish the truth conditions of a 
sentence from its felicity conditions and conversational implicatures. Thus a ‘False’ 
response by an untrained participant is argued to be ambiguous between whether the 
sentence is interpreted as infelicitous, pragmatically odd (due to a conversational 
implicature) or literally false.6  
Interestingly, Tonhauser and Matthewson (2015) are even less optimistic about 
entailment judgments, because they suspect that these cannot be performed reliably 
without linguistic training. It is also found problematic that entailment judgments are 
less immediate and require antecedent linguistic analysis on the part of participants 
and that they are to be performed without regard to the context of use. Yet, as 
Tonhauser and Matthewson also note, some of these problems may be circumvented 
by asking for judgments of contradictions for negations of entailments, since 
inconsistency judgments seem to be more immediate. In Skovgaard-Olsen (2019), a 
novel dialogical entailment task probing participants’ acceptance of entailments was 
introduced based on this idea to avoid previously identified pitfalls in the 
measurement of participants’ entailment judgments (Evans, 2002). 
In contrast, Tonhauser and Matthewson (2015) show a preference for 
acceptability, implication and similarity judgments, because they rely on rich contexts 
and do not presuppose prior linguistic training. However, one problem with this stance 
                                                             
6  Note that this will not help explain the results in Skovgaard-Olsen et al. (2017) for 
Truth-Conditional Inferentialism, however. The problem there was not so much the 
occurrence of ‘False’ responses by participants, but rather the lack of 'False' (or: ‘Neither nor’) 
responses in the true antecedent cells for the negative relevance and irrelevance conditions. 
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is, of course, that it becomes hard to dissociate the semantic content from the 
pragmatically enriched meaning.  
 
(III) To avoid a free-license in invoking pragmatics as an explanation of 
divergences from the semantic theory (such as the divergences from the 
Suppositional Theory reported in Section 2), mechanisms that give rise to 
the pragmatic phenomena need to be posited, which give rise to 
predictions that can be tested independently.   
 
In commenting on the findings from Skovgaard-Olsen et al. (2016a), Over and 
Cruz (2017) suggest that the effect might be pragmatic and not semantic, because 
there is some evidence that relevance also affects conjunctions and disjunctions. The 
implicit assumption is that if relevance is supposed to be part of the semantic content 
of indicative conditionals, then it should serve to distinguish the content of indicative 
conditionals from the semantic content of other connectives. 
 In Skovgaard-Olsen et al. (2017), disjunctions were not investigated. But the 
results on the probability assignments to conjunctions indicate that while the 
probability assignments are somewhat higher for the positive relevance condition (ΔP 
> 0), there is no evidence for an analogous defect to the one reported in Skovgaard-
Olsen et al. (2016a), which would make participants assign low probabilities to ‘A & C’ 
in the irrelevance (ΔP = 0) and negative relevance conditions (ΔP < 0). Skovgaard-
Olsen, Collins, Krzyżanowska, Hahn, and Klauer (2019a) also find that while reason-
relation readings of conjunctions can be attributed to conversational implicatures 
based on the results of a cancellation task, the same account does not apply to 
conditionals. 
 Moreover, based on Table 2 below, the conjecture could be made that 
disjunctions are most probable for negative relevance items. This is especially 
pronounced for the ‘either… or…’ formulation, which can be read as exclusive 
disjunction. But even for a reading of ‘… or …’ based on inclusive disjunctions, the 
negative relevance formulations that present the two disjuncts as alternatives seem to 
be more probable than the positive relevance formulations (see Table 2). At any rate, 
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disjunctions do not seem to exhibit the negative relevance defect that was 
documented for indicative conditionals in Skovgaard-Olsen et al. (2016a). If so, then 
disjunctions have a distinct relevance profile from indicative conditionals.7 
Table 2. Stimulus Materials, Mark Scenario illustrated with Disjunctions   
Scenario: Mark has just arrived home from work and there will shortly be a great movie on television to which 
he has been looking forward. Mark is quite excited because he recently bought a new TV with a large screen. 
He has a longing for popcorn, but his wife has probably eaten the last they had while he was gone. 
                        Positive Relevance                                  Negative Relevance                                 Irrelevance 
 HH  (Either) Mark presses the on switch 
on his TV OR his TV will be turned 
on  
(Either) Mark lacks an 
appointment with the 
repairman OR his TV will work.  
(Either) Mark is wearing socks 
OR his TV will work.  
 HL  (Either) Mark looks for popcorn OR 
he will be having popcorn.  
(Either) Mark presses the on 
switch on his TV OR his TV will 
be turned off.  
(Either) Mark is wearing socks 
OR his TV will malfunction.  
 LH  (Either) the sales clerk in the local 
supermarket presses the on switch 
on Mark’s TV OR his TV will be 
turned on.  
(Either) Mark pulls the plug on 
his TV OR his TV will be turned 
on.  
(Either) Mark is wearing a dress 
OR his TV will work.  
 LL  (Either) Mark pulls the plug on his 
TV OR his TV will be turned off.  
(Either) Mark refuses to look 
for popcorn OR he will be 
having popcorn.  
(Either) Mark is wearing a dress 
OR his TV will malfunction.  
Note. 'HH': P(A) = high, P(C) = high. 'HL': P(A) = high, P(C) = low, etc. Skovgaard-Olsen et al. (2016b). 
 
But irrespectively of how this empirical issue is resolved, (III) still suggests that if 
the Relevance Effect reported in Skovgaard-Olsen et al. (2016a) on the probability 
ratings of indicative conditionals is to be declared a pragmatic effect, we need to 
require that a suitable mechanism be specified which will lead to new predictions. 
Since Grice (1989) has a maxim of relevance, which Grice never elucidated 
further than “Be relevant!”, it is tempting to invoke it to account for relevance effects 
on indicative conditionals. However, it should be noted that relevance can be assessed 
at different levels and that whereas Grice’s maxim concerns the contribution of 
complete speech acts to a conversational context, the epistemic notion of relevance 
used in Skovgaard-Olsen et al. (2016a, b) concerned the internal relationship between                                                              
7  One might object to this by taking the meaning of disjunctions to be characterized by 
or-introduction, which holds that a disjunction may be introduced in a proof whenever one of 
the disjuncts is true. In response, it could be argued that negative relevance is a conventional 
implicature of disjunctions which does not affect their truth-conditional content. Finally, that 
there should be a relationship between negative relevance and disjunctions is already 
suggested by the fact that there are acceptable instances of inferences from ‘A or C’ to ‘if 
non-A, then C' (Skovgaard-Olsen, 2016).  
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two components in a sentence. That these evaluations of relevance can come apart is 
nicely illustrated by the example ‘If it snows in July, the Government will fall’ 
introduced in Douven (2015). The point is that although this conditional violates the 
expectation that the antecedent is positively relevant for the consequent, there may 
nevertheless be a rhetorical point in making this assertion, which makes the assertion 
relevant as a speech act in the conversation. More specifically, the speaker may be 
interpreted as making the rhetorical point that it is so obvious that the consequent will 
hold no matter what happens (and thus even under such absurd circumstances as it 
snowing in July). In Douven (2017) an argument is moreover made that the other 
Gricean maxims of informative and non-misleading conversation do not put us in a 
better position to account for the influence of relevance on our assessments of 
indicative conditionals. Finally, when examining whether the reason-relation reading is 
cancellable without contradiction, Skovgaard-Olsen et al. (2019a) could not find 
evidence of this general property of conversational implicatures for indicative 
conditionals. 
Alternatively, other roles that have been assigned to pragmatics could be 
considered. As an example, Carston (2002) argues at some length that the semantic 
content of sentences in itself only suffices to provide a schema for a proposition and 
that processes of pragmatic interpretation apply even before a truth-conditional 
content has been determined (by resolving reference assignments, ambiguities etc.). 
However, given that relevance was found only to moderately affect the truth 
evaluations of indicative conditionals in the ⊥⊥ cell in Skovgaard-Olsen et al. (2017), it 
is unlikely that relevance assessments is a factor that enters directly into determining 
the propositional content of conditionals.  
At this stage, further experiments are needed to determine whether support can 
be found for other pragmatic accounts or whether relevance is part of the 
probabilistic, semantic content of indicative conditionals. In Skovgaard-Olsen et al. 
(2019a) a range of experiments of this kind are reported, but much remains to be 
done. 
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Argument for Semantic Defect 
In Skovgaard-Olsen (2016) arguments were presented for counting relevance part of 
the semantic content of indicative conditionals. Here I would like to focus on a 
particular argument. The argument focuses on the cognitive utility of the linguistically 
encoded content of normal conditionals and points out that missing-link conditionals 
are semantically defective, because they have a literal content that prevents them 
from fulfilling this cognitive role. In stating the argument, it was pointed out that the 
defect of missing-link conditionals could not be limited to violations of Gricean norms, 
because Gricean norms pertain to conversational contexts, and missing-link 
conditionals are prevented from fulfilling the cognitive role of normal conditionals 
even in individual reasoning. In particular, it was pointed out that the appeal to 
indicative conditionals as “inference tickets” that give interlocutors the right to infer 
the consequent from the antecedent is blocked for missing-link conditionals both in 
conversational contexts and in individual reasoning.  
Here I would like to extend this argument by pointing to further aspects of the 
cognitive role of conditionals in individual reasoning which are blocked for missing-link 
conditionals, because they require conditionals to express reason relations. Now 
functional arguments that posit that the core, semantic meaning of a class of 
expressions is determined by its distinctive cognitive role may not be the primary 
focus for the type of linguistically motivated, formal semantics advocated in Yalcin 
(2014, 2018). But functional considerations are of central concern for semantic 
theories advanced in psychology (in particular in the psychology of reasoning), and 
thus for the integration of formal semantics with psychology in cognitive science.    
As explained above, according to the Suppositional Theory of conditionals, the 
word ‘if’ is to be understood through its role in hypothetical thought of initiating 
imagination and simulation of possibilities (Evans and Over, 2004; Evans, 2007). This 
type of mental simulation is thought to play a central role in entertaining hypotheses, 
forecasting future events, and supporting decision-making by imagining the 
16 
 
consequences of alternative courses of action (Evans, Handley, Neilens, and Over, 
2007). All of these mental processes are without doubt central to human thought. 
 A further central role of conditional reasoning is in argumentation, where reason 
relations can be expressed by means of conditionals, which are often compared to 
‘condensed arguments’ (Rescher, 2007; Krzyżanowska, 2015). 
 Now when Inferentialism puts the emphasis on conditionals’ role in expressing 
reason relations is it then committed to denying the central role of conditionals in 
hypothetical thought as emphasized by the Suppositional Theory? No, because 
missing-link conditionals are just as useless in explanatory reasoning, forecasting, and 
decision-making as they are in argumentation. When considering alternative 
explanatory hypotheses, predicting the future, and computing consequences of 
alternative courses of action, the agent needs to make assessments of which 
propositions are probability raising, or probability lowering, for other propositions. 
Because hypothetical thought is unbounded in that it can transcend the here-and-now 
and consider even remote possibilities (of which there are an infinite number), 
propositions that do not make a probabilistic difference to the propositions of interest 
need to be set aside as irrelevant. It is a sign of rationality in hypothetical thought that 
probabilistic dependencies are respected even if the basis of the reflection may depart 
from the actual course of events. 
 This point should be evident. But to illustrate, suppose the color of the socks of 
Stalin stood in the center of explanatory reasoning aimed at resolving why Operation 
Barbarossa turned out to be an utter failure, that the color of the socks of Angela 
Merkel was used to predict the outlines of the next European treaty, or that the prime 
minister of a European country used the color of the socks of other European leaders 
to calculate the consequences of alternative courses of actions guiding his/her 
decision-making. The thought is so absurd that it is hard even to entertain.8 
                                                             
8  It is, of course, possible to restore sense in such examples by creating elaborate 
scenarios, where factors that initially appear irrelevant turn out to be relevant after all. But 
what this shows is that probabilistic dependence is so important to us that we invest cognitive 
effort into restoring it. 
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 This illustrates that the mental processes of suppositional reasoning are only 
useful as long as only hypotheses are considered that preserve probabilistic 
dependencies. In the Default and Penalty Hypothesis the conditional probability is per 
default computed in the positive relevance condition as a way of assessing the 
sufficiency of the reason relation (Skovgaard-Olsen et al., 2016a). As long as only 
probability raising scenarios are considered, the Ramsey test is an effective mental 
algorithm for engaging in hypothetical thought. However, if there are no constraints 
on which hypotheses the Ramsey test is applied to, then it will not in itself help us 
explain past events, predict the future, or decide among alternative courses of action.  
 In Rescher’s (2007: 75) words: “conditionals effectively summarize the result of 
hypothetical inferences”. And in making hypothetical inferences we are, of course, 
constrained by probabilistic dependencies that govern all other types of thought. 
 However, even if such reflections suggest that irrelevance is a semantic defect of 
conditionals, because irrelevance prevents conditionals from playing the cognitive role 
in individual reasoning and conversational contexts, which pertains to the core 
meaning of these constructions, the jury is still out on empirically determining its 
precise nature. In Skovgaard-Olsen (2016), it was tentatively suggested that epistemic 
relevance could be thought of as part of the sense-dimension of meaning 
characterizing its cognitive role.9 In Skovgaard-Olsen et al. (2017), a stark dissociation 
between the effect of relevance on probability and truth evaluations of indicative 
conditionals is reported. Since presuppositions and conventional implicatures are 
distinguished by whether there is a dependence on their failure for the truth 
conditions of the sentences in which they occur (Potts, 2007, 2015), the arrow 
currently points in the direction of conventional implicatures. This conjecture receives 
further support by the results in Skovgaard-Olsen et al. (2019a), where evidence 
against both a conversational implicature hypothesis and a presuppositional account 
of relevance effects is reported. If the reason-relation reading of conditionals is 
generated by a conventional implicature, then it would have to be part of a secondary                                                              
9  But it would have to be on an expanded notion of sense (Sinn), whereby it did not play 
a role in determining reference (Bedeutung), as in Frege (1892). 
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layer of meaning that is lexically encoded as part of the default meaning of natural 
language conditionals, which potentially coexists with a further layer (like the one 
posited by the Suppositional Theory of conditionals). However, the data pattern that 
emerges is complex and may introduce a need for revision of the notion of 
conventional implicatures with regard to their status of being not at-issue content, as 
Skovgaard-Olsen et al. (2019a) further argue.  
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